Iran missile launches slowing; drone interceptor weakness exposed in war
Deep dive, geeky take on the missile/interceptor technology that is being used by the Iranians, Israelis and the United States. Meanwhile, why are Iranian drones getting through American defenses?
BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: Iran’s apparent strategy is to deplete the missile interceptor stocks of the United States and its regional allies. The counter: Israel/US are trying to destroy Iran’s transport/launch assets before they launch.
Rate of missile launches have slowed: In the last four days, Iran has launched about 600-700 missiles. During the 12-Day War with Israel, it launched ~500-600 missiles. Since the ongoing war’s first 24 hours, Iran’s launches have sharply reduced.
Long-range drones exposed gaps in the air defense systems in the region: targets of Iranian drones had to use manned aircraft, but some Iranian drones broke through defenses and hit targets like the U.S. embassy in Riyadh.
This weakness in the air defense systems in the Middle East is a big opportunity for Ukrainian defense tech startups. At present time, waiting lists for conventional interceptors are 1.5 to 2.5 years.
This post offers an initial assessment of the missile war, which has defined the early stages of this conflict, in terms of missile and interceptor availability.
Plus, we’ll get into the implications for Ukraine at the bottom.
TEL HUNTING: Racing to destroy Iran’s missiles before defense interceptors run out
The central military dynamic between Israel and the United States on the one hand and Iran on the other can be understood as a race to the bottom.
Iran is seeking to deplete regional missile defence arsenals while inflicting damage. In contrast, the United States and Israel are attempting to locate and destroy Iranian transporter erector launchers (TELs) before they can fire, while also degrading command and control and Iranian missile production capacity.
“TEL hunting”, as this mission is commonly described, has historically proven extremely difficult. Israel’s air campaign against Iran last year arguably marked the first instance of an air interdiction campaign successfully targeting enemy TELs at scale.
That success now appears to be repeating itself, with dozens of videos published by U.S. and Israeli official channels showing the destruction of Iranian mobile launchers. The Israeli Air Force has stated that it alone has destroyed over 300 missile launchers since the beginning of the war.
IRANIAN EFFORTS TO DEGRADE REGIONAL AIR DEFENSES: Relatively few launches as compared to 2025 12-Day War
Iran has responded with missile and long-range drone attacks against U.S. bases in the region, Israel, and regional neighbours, particularly Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Targets have included military and civilian infrastructure, as well as population centres.
Iran’s ballistic missile launches have appeared more unevenly spaced, significantly smaller in scale, and less coordinated. This likely reflects the effects of the ongoing U.S. and Israeli strike campaign.
In total, Iran probably launched around 600 to 700 ballistic missiles in this war so far, which is comparatively limited.
During the 12-Day War, Iran appears to have expended roughly 500 to 600 ballistic missiles. Given that the confrontation is arguably more existential from a regime-survival perspective, one would, in principle, expect incentives for more extensive use.
In addition, during the 12-Day War, Iran regularly managed to launch salvos of 40 to 50 ballistic missiles at a time, including several days into the war.
Current video footage of interceptor launches, for example, during a strike on Doha, Qatar, late in the evening of 28 February, suggests that double-digit ballistic missile salvos have still occurred, though have remained the exception.
Indeed, since 1 March — i.e., within 24 hours of the beginning of the confrontation —Iranian ballistic missile usage appears to have decreased sharply. The UAE, which has received the brunt of Iranian ballistic missile attacks and has been relatively transparent about the number of missiles launched at its territory, reported 165 ballistic missiles during the first two days.
In the subsequent three days (at the time of writing, 4 March), the UAE reported only 9, 12, and 3 ballistic missile launches against its territory, respectively. Long-range drone launches are reportedly similarly decreasing.
CAT VS. MOUSE ON MISSILES VS. INTERCEPTORS:
Whether the United States and regional allies can outlast Iran until its ballistic missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded depends to a large extent on allied interceptor depth.
Reasonable estimates can be made based on how many interceptors the Gulf states were authorized to purchase in the years prior to that.
The table above provides an estimate of ballistic missile interceptor stocks that the Gulf states were authorized to purchase before the war. Note that this estimate represents a theoretical maximum — often they will purchase less, possibly around 50 to 80 percent.
As noted above, according to official UAE information, the country detected 165 Iranian ballistic missiles during the first two days of the war.
Assuming that each detected ballistic missile was engaged, and an average of 2.5 interceptors were allocated per projectile, this implies an interceptor use of roughly 410.
The UAE likely did not bear the full burden of these engagements, however, as the United States also deploys Patriot fire units on its territory.
If the UAE accounted for roughly half of the allocated interceptors, depletion over the first two days would amount to around 200 interceptors. This would correspond to roughly 20 to 40 percent of its stockpile, depending on pre-war stockpiles.
This example illustrates that concerns about the availability of ballistic missile defence interceptors were entirely justified.
Had the intensity of Iranian ballistic missile attacks observed during the first two days continued at the same pace, Emirati interceptor inventories would likely have been severely depleted within a few days to a week. The same logic applies to the other Gulf states.
However, given that the intensity of Iranian ballistic missile attacks appears to have declined sharply, the situation now appears far less alarming.
Implications for Ukraine
Long-range drones have exposed capability gaps in the defense postures of the Gulf states.
Neither the Gulf states nor the United States deploy optimized interceptor systems in sufficient numbers, relying instead on manned aircraft to intercept incoming Shahed-type drones. Nevertheless, individual drones have repeatedly penetrated defenses and struck military and symbolic targets, including the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, which overall does not reflect well on U.S. and allied militaries.
The primary implications for Ukraine are twofold.
First, demand for Patriot interceptors will increase as the Gulf states seek to replenish their arsenals after the war.
Both Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are expanding their production lines.
Even so, unless the supply increase outpaces the surge in demand, acquiring Patriot interceptors will not become easier, including for Ukraine.
With several European, Asian, and Middle Eastern customers, as well as the United States itself, competing for limited production slots, it is unlikely that interceptor lead times will decrease in the near term.
At present, these are estimated at 1.5 to 2.5 years.
Second, the war in the Middle East exposes a capability gap in the arsenals of the Gulf states in the area of long-range drone defense.
After the war, whose outcome remains uncertain, Gulf states will likely move quickly to close this capability gap.
Ukrainian companies may be well-positioned to offer battle-tested counter-drone technologies to Gulf customers. At the same time, they will likely face intense competition from European missile defense startups, as well as from established European and American primes seeking to offer their own drone defense systems to Middle Eastern buyers.
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